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It  is  widely  thought  that  intra-firm  integration  has  a  positive  effect  on  organizational 
performance, especially in environments characterized by complex and uncertain information.   
However, counter arguments suggest that integration may limit flexibility and thereby reduce 
performance in the face of uncertainty. Research and development activities of a firm are 
especially likely to face complex and uncertain information environments. Following prior 
work in contingency theory, this paper analyzes the effects of intra-organizational integration 
on manufacturing firms’ innovative performance. Based on a survey of R&D units in US 
manufacturing firms and patent data from the NBER patent database, we examine the relation 
between  mechanisms  for  linking  R&D  to  other  units  of  the  firm  and  the  relative 
innovativeness of the firm. Furthermore, we argue that the impact of integration may vary by 
the importance of secrecy in protecting firms’ innovation advantages. We find that intra-firm 
integration is associated with higher self-reported innovativeness and more patents. We also 
find some evidence that this effect is moderated by the appropriability regime the firm faces, 
with the benefits of cross-functional integration being weaker in industries where secrecy is 
especially  important.  These  results  both  support  and  develop  the  contingency  model  of 
organizational performance.   
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As  firms  become  larger  and  their  markets  expand,  the  internal  division  of  labor 
becomes increasingly important.    As Adam Smith noted at the beginning of the industrial 
era,  the  division  of  labor  is  critical  for  increasing  returns  in  the  modern  economy.    An 
increasing  division  of  labor  creates  the  advantages  of  specialization  and  the  associated 
accumulation  of  skills  and  productivity  gains  from  deeper  learning  by  doing  and 
experimenting  (Foss,  2001;  Simon,  2002).  However,  according  to  Simon  (2002),  “all 
complex  organizations  are  nearly  decomposable”  implying  that  the  components  are  still 
interdependent although they are specialized in a division of labor.    Foss (2001) argues that 
an increase in the division of labor can cause greater complexity and uncertainty, hampering 
coordination of the specialized and interdependent tasks and thereby resulting in “problems 
of  bottlenecks  and  problems  from  uneven  development  of  components”.    Therefore, 
specialization in organizations creates the need to account for the interdependencies within 
the  organization  in  order  to  ensure  smooth  operation  of  the  whole.    This  problem  is 
exacerbated in a modern knowledge-based economy that is continually seeing the emergence 
of new, complex technologies, new products and new markets, so that strict specialization of 
functions  in  an  organization  may  cause  inefficiency  and  ineffectiveness  in  organizational 
performance.    The marketing, R&D, and production departments in a company, all of which 
have different objectives traditionally, need to cooperate with one another to develop and 
introduce  innovations  (Burns  and  Stalker,  1961).    Increasing  product  complexity  and 
complex  development  processes  require  firms  to  integrate  knowledge  from  diverse, 
specialized subunits (Emmanuelides, 1993).    However, conflicts between an R&D lab with a 
long-term  goal  of  developing  cutting-edge  technology  and  eager  to  apply  the  latest 
technology for products and a marketing department with a short-term goal of gaining quick  
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profits and pursuing incremental modifications of products matching the demands of buyers 
can prevent responsiveness to rapid changes of the market and prevent mutually beneficial 
decision making (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a; Dougherty, 1992).   
Furthermore,  complex,  interdependent  modern  technology  often  requires  detailed,  and 
sometimes tacit, knowledge to operate efficiently, and such knowledge needs to be generated 
and transmitted through coordination among different work units (Chuma, 2006).    Therefore, 
managing  specialization  and  coordination  simultaneously  is  critical  for  organizational 
performance.   
Prior work suggests that integrating distinct but interdependent organizational units 
may be key to promoting effective performance, especially for generating rapid innovation 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a; Van de Ven et al., 1976; Clark et al., 
1987; Hage et al., 2008; Liu, 2009).    Building on this literature, this paper presents data on 
the effects of integration on U.S. manufacturing firms’ innovative performance, measured by 
self-reported innovativeness and granted patents.    Furthermore, we consider the effects of 
organizational  environment  as  an  additional  contingency  for  the  effect  of  integration  on 
organizational  performance.    In  particular,  while  information  sharing  may  be  key  to 
improving integration, secrecy can also be a key component of firm appropriability strategy, 
although the importance of secrecy varies by industry (Cohen et al., 2000).    Thus, we test to 
see if the effect of integration varies by the importance of secrecy in an industry.    Based on 
data from the Carnegie Mellon survey of R&D managers and the NBER patent database, we 
find that for manufacturing firms in the U.S., the strength of inter-departmental integration 
has a significant positive effect on organizational innovative performance.    However, we 
also find that this effect differs depending on the importance of secrecy in the innovation 
process.   
In Section 2, we discuss theoretical and empirical background and our hypotheses.    
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Section 3 describes the dataset and variables.    Section 4 presents the results.    Section 5 
discusses the implications of our findings. 
 
 
2. Contingency Theory and Innovation Performance 
 
Lawrence  and  Lorsch  (1967a,  1967b)  define  differentiation  as  “the  difference  in 
cognitive and emotional orientation among managers in different functional departments” or 
“the  status  of  segmentation  of  the  organizational  system  into  subsystems  with  particular 
attributes related to its relevant external environment (i.e. the formal division of labor)”, and 
integration as “the quality of the state of collaboration that exists among departments that are 
required to achieve unity of effort by the demands of the environment.”    In this paper, taking 
into  account  Lawrence  and  Lorsch’s  definition,  we  focus  on  functional  differentiation 
(specialization)  and  integration,  i.e.,  coordinating  the  different  functional  units  through 
various integrating structures.    A key finding of contingency theory is that the optimal level 
of integration is contingent on the level of differentiation.    The expansion of organization 
size  generates  functional  and  structural  differentiation  with  an  increasing  number  of 
components, which creates pressure for coordination (Blau, 1970).    However, it is costly to 
coordinate specialized subunits because the greater structural differentiation leads to greater 
inter-subunit heterogeneity and higher intra-subunit homogeneity (Child, 1972).    Therefore, 
the effect of integration on organizational performance can vary by the level of differentiation, 
because organizations with higher differentiation require coordination more than those with 
low differentiation.    Expanding on this and focusing on product components’ specificity and 
decomposability  rather  than  an  organization’s  structural  differentiation,  recent  work  by 
Antonio et al. (2009) shows how the effect of internal integration varies in high and low  
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product  modularity,  which  is  defined  as  “separateness,  specificity  and  transferability  of 
product  components  in  a  product  system”  (Antonio  et  al.,  2009).    Also,  taking  into 
consideration the increasing complexity and uncertainty, Foss (2001) reiterates and sharpens 
Coasian price coordination by emphasizing the importance of managed coordination.    He 
emphasizes the importance of managed coordination over price coordination because of the 
“inability  to  specify  future  states  of  the  world”  and  the  appearance  of  “new  unknown 
interdependencies between tasks and endogenous technological uncertainty by an increasing 
division of labor” (Foss, 2001).    Thus, we see that specialization combined with uncertainty 
puts  strains  on  organizational  functioning  and  increases  demands  for  coordination  of 
heterogeneous but interdependent units. 
Integrating diverse functional units has been shown to help improve coordination and 
overcoming some of the difficulties generated by specialization, although the optimal level of 
coordination varies by the nature of the knowledge being shared and by the environmental 
uncertainties the organization faces (Lawrence and  Lorsch, 1967a; Hansen, 1999).    Prior 
studies of innovation have shown that integration contributes to firm development through 
combining diverse knowledge, narrowing the gap between functionally different work units 
such  as  marketing,  production  and  R&D  groups,  and  reduces  project  completion  time 
producing  higher  quality  products  and  satisfying  their  customers  more  than  the  less-
integrated system (Clark et al., 1987; Fujimoto, 1989; Iansiti and Clark, 1994; Rondeau et al., 
2000).    For example, Clark et al. (1987) analyze differences in R&D performance among 
Japanese, U.S. and European auto firms based on project strategies and organization.    Their 
study shows that high specialization can cause  disconnects among work units as well as 
wasted  time  because  it  requires  time  for  workers  to  understand  each  other’s  work  and 
generates difficulties in coordination and mutual adjustment.    They find that Japanese auto 
companies  are  more  integrated  and  less  specialized  than  their  American  and  European  
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counterparts and also spend fewer hours to complete their projects whereas the U.S. and 
European auto companies use relatively weak integrative devices even though they are more 
specialized  than  the  Japanese.    Moreover,  integration  is  also  critical  for  technology 
commercialization by developing cross-functional skills and combining different functions 
necessary for technology commercialization (Zahra and Nielsen, 2002).    Some companies 
can succeed in technology commercialization with limited resources but effective integration 
while others can fail due to a lack of effective integration despite abundant resources (Ettlie, 
1988; Song et al., 1997). These prior studies suggest that maximization of benefits from 
functional  diversity  can  be  achieved  by  generating  consensus  through  collaborative 
communications, negotiation, and integrative activities (Lovelace et al., 2001).    Integration 
(through such mechanisms as interdepartmental committees, cross-functional teams, or on-
line forums) provides a locus for members in functionally different units of an organization to 
congregate and strive to solve problems in concert (Nonaka and Konno, 1998).     
  The importance of integrating functionally differentiated units is also highlighted by 
arguments about the importance of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003).    In less uncertain 
environments,  organizations  may  be  able  to  develop  their  new  products  in  the  simple 
sequential model which consists of “planning for an entire product”, “a specific new product 
program”, “feature-cost tradeoffs”, “technical specifications”, and “pre-production and ramp-
up”  (Nemetz  and  Fry,  1988;  Gerwin,  1993).    This  simplified  process  does  not  strongly 
depend  on  joint  participation  of  R&D,  marketing  and  production  units  in  product 
development.    However,  the  continuous  evolution  of  knowledge  creates  technological 
complexity and interdependence among actors’ diverse knowledge and skills for completing 
the final project (Rosenberg, 1976; Nelson, 2003; Zhong and Ozdemir, 2010).    Therefore, a 
more uncertain and complex environment increases the need for organizations to manage 
their environment through integrative activities across different functional units (Nemetz and  
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Fry,  1988;  Berends  et  al.,  2007).    This  need  for  integration  can  include  the  need  to 
incorporate input from suppliers and customers into the innovation process (Von Hippel and 
Von  Hippel,  1988,  Chesbrough  2003;  Von  Hippel,  2005).    Ettlie  (1995)  argues  that  a 
changing competitive environment with high uncertainty, complexity, and flexibility requires 
integration  among  different  disciplines  and  functions.    Moreover,  intra-organizational, 
multifunctional teamwork can reduce internal transaction costs, increasing efficiency (Ettlie, 
1995).    Therefore, in the face of high information complexity and uncertainty (as is the case 
for R&D units), integrating functionally different parts of an organization should increase 
performance.   
On the other hand, integration may have negative effects on innovative performance 
under constraints of bureaucracies and structured organizational routines (Rogers, 1995).    If 
innovation is closely watched by a variety of departments with different interests and has to 
adhere  to  the  expectations  of  various  audiences,  truly  innovative  ideas  may  be  squashed 
before  they  can  stand  on  their  own.    Rogers  (1995)  emphasizes  the  potential  of 
“skunkworks”
1,  or  independent  R&D,  using  examples  of  the  development  of  the  P-80 
Shooting Star fighter jet and the Macintosh computer.    Rich (1994) claims that skunkworks 
are more effective for small programs than large programs because they are risking a smaller 
budget, but that they are most effective as part of a large entity to be able to access the larger 
resource  as  necessary.    Skunkworks  can  elicit  creativity  not  constrained  by  convention, 
procedure, rules and routines (Rich, 1994; Fosfuri and Rønde, 2009).    Moreover, Fosfuri 
and  Rønde  (2009)  argue  that  skunkworks,  isolated  from  the  large  entity  (i.e.,  weakly 
intergrated R&D units), can lead to a more radical research trajectory, avoiding conservative 
thinking by internal competition between an R&D unit and other units, whereas R&D units 
                                            
1  “Skunkworks” or “Skunk Works” originated from Lockheed’s (a developer of the P-80 Shooting 
Star) secret research and development projects named after the “Skunk Works” factory in Al Capp’s 
Li’l Abner comic strip and representing geopolitically and psychologically independent groups (Rich, 
1994; Rogers, 1995; Bommer et al., 2002).  
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that are tightly integrated are more likely to choose an incremental research trajectory with 
low risk.    Skunkworks, however, can generate difficulties for collaboration and coordination 
between an R&D project team and other units leading to an increase in costs for integrating 
radical  innovation  by  an  R&D  unit  into  the  large  entity  (Fosfuri  and  Rønde,  2009).
2   
Furthermore, Fosfuri and Rønde (2009) find that exploitation by R&D units in integration 
with other units can also engender exploration if R&D units are capable enough, suggesting 
that integration may not reduce creativity.     
Thus,  we  have  arguments  suggesting  offsetting  hypotheses  on  the  effects  of 
integration on R&D performance: 
 
HYPOTHESIS  1a:    Integration  improves  innovative  performance  due  to  information 
sharing and coordinated development. 
 
HYPOTHESIS  1b:    Integration  limits  innovative  performance  due  to  bureaucratic 
constraints on R&D creativity. 
 
 
If hypothesis 1a is true, the effects of integration on improving performance should be even 
stronger in more differentiated organizations, either those that span industries, or in larger 
organizations, which we expect to be more differentiated (Blau, 1970). 
Furthermore, we expect that the effect of integration will not be constant in every 
organization  because  organizations  operate  under  different  environmental  conditions.    As 
                                            
2  Integration also requires different types of maintenance costs.    Hansen (2002) raises the concern 
that while direct relations (i.e., short network paths) among different units accelerate transfer of tacit 
knowledge  and  help  incorporate  knowledge  from  other  units  to  finish  the  project,  they  require 
maintenance costs with their associated distractions from tasks and are not necessary when codified 
knowledge is used for the project, thereby slowing the project completion time in such cases.  
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Lawrence  and  Lorsch  (1967a)  addressed  in  their  work,  organizations  under  different 
environmental conditions benefit from different internal characteristics and abilities to deal 
with those conditions effectively, that is, the relation is contingent.    Optimal organizational 
structure can vary by environment, technology, and size (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a; Blau, 
1970; Woodward, 1970; Child, 1972; Woodward et al., 1994).    Child (1972) suggests that 
“environmental  variability”  (i.e.  uncertainty),  “environmental  complexity”,  and 
“environmental  illiberality”  (i.e.  the  degree  of  decision-makers’  discretion)  influence  the 
optimal choice of organizations’ structural forms.    Tidd (2001) argues that uncertainty and 
complexity  are  two  key  environmental  contingencies  that  account  for  variation  in 
organizational  configuration  and  performance.    Our  first  hypotheses  test  the  effect  of 
organizational structure (i.e., an R&D unit’s integration with other functional units) on its 
innovative performance under conditions of uncertainty (i.e., rapid change of technology) and 
complexity  (i.e.,  technological  and  organizational  interdependency)  as  environmental 
constraints (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a; Thompson, 1967; Tidd, 
2001).    We  can  think  of  this  as  the  first-level  contingency  hypothesis  (in  environments 
characterized  by  high  uncertainty  and  complexity,  integration  is  key  for  performance).   
However, in the R&D context, in addition to the need to integrate across functional units, 
secrecy is also often important for maintaining appropriability of the rents from innovation, to 
prevent copying and to maintain lead time advantages (Cohen et al., 2000).    Thus, moving 
beyond  the  traditional  contingency  theory  arguments,  we  develop  contingency  theory  by 
considering another environmental constraint, that is, the importance of secrecy.    We argue 
that the effect of integration should be contingent on the appropriability regime, in particular, 
the importance of secrecy.    Tacit knowledge, or non-codified knowledge, such as knowhow, 
is learned by doing and requires inter-personal communication for sharing, and is also often 
protected by secrecy (Polanyi, 1962; Liebeskind, 1997).    In addition, R&D strategy may  
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also  require  secrecy  to  maintain  lead  time  advantages.    However,  while  interaction  and 
exchange of knowledge among members in different work units of an organization facilitates 
transfer of knowledge, involved individuals can obtain knowledge of other team members 
and expropriate the knowledge, increasing the risk of leaking it to external agents (Liebeskind, 
1996; Jaffe, et al., 2000).    For example, a recent New York Times article tells the story of 
Thomas’ English muffin (Neuman, 2010).    Thomas’ strategic advantage was built on a trade 
secret  over  the  production  process.    The  company  compartmentalized  the  important 
information about their muffin production process into several pieces to keep it secret and to 
prevent it leaking out, leaving most production employees and supervisors know only the 
piece of information directly relevant to their task (low integration).    Only seven employees 
in the whole company knew every step.    This created a crisis for the company when a high-
level manager (one of the few with complete knowledge) attempted to leave the company and 
offered  to  teach  rival  Hostess  the  secrets.  Only  legal  action  prevented  the  spillover.   
However, this example shows the potential risks from integration in an industry that depends 
heavily on secrecy to maintain strategic advantage (in this case, for over 100 years, long after 
any patents would have expired).    Maintaining such secrecy would be very difficult if tight 
integration led to the knowledge being widely distributed throughout the firm.    Unintended 
disclosure  of  information  can  also  happen  when  other  units  may  have  links  outside  the 
organization, such as between marketing/sales  and customers or production and suppliers 
(Bolton  et  al.,  1994).    As  Teece  (1986)  and  Liebeskind  (1996)  argue,  a  firm  requires 
complementary assets for commercialization of new knowledge and may need the help of 
external agents as well as internal agents, thereby necessitating exchange of knowledge but 
deteriorating  protection  of  knowledge.    Moreover,  secret  information  is  especially 
vulnerable because competitors can use it if they can legitimately access it, unlike patented 
information  (Seidel  and  Panich,  1973;  Liebeskind,  1997).    As  Liebeskind  (1997)  argues,  
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knowledge can be better protected by impeding communication and structural isolation.    It, 
however, increases coordination costs and R&D costs to incorporate knowledge under high 
secrecy  constraints,  thereby  dampening  innovation  (Liebeskind,  1997).    Therefore, 
integrating different pieces of information separately belonging to individuals or units (as a 
result of an effort for protecting knowledge or specialization) is imperative for innovation, 
but at the same time, enables those involved to identify the final integrated knowledge, and 
increasing the risk of knowledge spillovers and the potential loss of competitive advantage 
(Liebeskind,  1996;  Rønde,  2001).    Based  on  these  arguments,  we  postulate  that 
organizations  need  a  certain  level  of  integration  for  innovation,  but  with  the  effects  of 
integration varying with the importance of secrecy in their appropriability regime.    More 
specifically, the positive effect of integration can be weaker for industries that use secrecy as 
their key appropriability mechanism (Cohen et al., 2000).    This can be either because in high 
secrecy  industries,  units  are  unwilling  to  communicate  with  others  even  in  the  same 
organization (e.g., R&D units’ not sharing research plans during interdepartmental committee 
meeting  for  fear  that  sales  will  leak  the  information)  making  integrating  structures  less 
productive, or because shared information leaks to competitors leading to loss of lead time 
(or even being scooped).    Thus, our second hypothesis is stated as: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. The relation between integration and innovative performance is dampened 
for industries where secrecy is a key appropriability mechanism. 
 
Thus, we are testing two versions of the contingency theory.    The first is that, in an 
environment where uncertainty and complexity (information needs) are high, as is the case 
for R&D units, integration should improve performance (if the knowledge integration and 
coordination theories are correct), or may dampen performance (if the independence from  
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bureaucratic  control  and  skunk  works  theories  are  correct).    Furthermore,  we  develop  a 
second  contingency  argument,  which  is  that  the  impact  of  integration  on  performance  is 
dampened  in  high  secrecy  environments.  We  use  survey  and  archival  data  on  R&D  unit 
structures and performance to test these hypotheses. 
 
 
3. Data and Method 
 
The main data come from the Carnegie Mellon Survey (CMS) of R&D managers, 
administered in 1994 (Cohen et al., 2000).    The population sampled is R&D units located in 
the U.S. conducting R&D in manufacturing industries as part of a manufacturing firm.    The 
sample was randomly selected from the eligible labs listed in the Directory of American 
Research and Technology (Bowker, 1995) or belonging to firms listed in Standard and Poor’s 
COMPUSTAT, stratified by 3-digit SIC industry.
3    The survey asked R&D lab managers to 
answer questions with reference to the “focus industry,” defined as the principal industry for 
which the unit was conducting its R&D. The survey received 1478 valid responses, with an 
unadjusted response rate of 46% and an adjusted response rate of 54 %.
4    The survey data 
are supplemented with published data on firm sales and employees from COMPUSTAT, Dun 
and Bradstreet, Moody’s, Ward’s and similar sources.   
For the analysis in this paper, we restricted our sample to firms whose focus industry 
was  in  the  manufacturing  sector  and  which  were  not  foreign  owned  and  had  at  least 
$5,000,000 in firm sales, or business units (defined as a firm’s activity in a specific industry) 
                                            
3  Fortune 500 firms are oversampled.   
4  A nonrespondent survey allowed us to estimate what percent of nonrespondents were not in the 
target population. The results showed that 28% of nonrespondents were ineligible for the survey 
because they either did no manufacturing or did no R&D. Excluding these from the denominator, as 
well as respondents who should not have been sampled, yields an adjusted response rate of 54% of 
eligible respondents.    
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of at least 20 people, yielding a sample of 1122 cases.
5  We also used patent data from NBER 
patent dataset (Hall et al., 2001) which were matched to each CMS R&D unit (Roach and 
Cohen, 2010).    Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics on the sample. 
 
 
3.1. Dependent variables 
 
Innovativeness.    We use the term “innovativeness” to mean the relative success of the firm 
in introducing product innovations.    This measure is based on a self-reported scale.    The 
self-reported innovativeness represents a firm’s innovativeness against others in its industry 
at the same time.    The CMS asks respondents at what rate product innovations have been 
introduced by their firm in the period 1991-1993, compared to all other firms in their focus 
industry  that  sell  in  the  U.S.  market.    There  were  five  response  categories:  substantially 
above  average,  slightly  above  average,  average,  slightly  below  average,  and  substantially 
below average.    We used a five-point ordinal variables ranked from the lowest (=1) to the 
highest (=5) innovativeness.    While this measure has the advantage of measuring the relative 
strategic advantage of the responding R&D unit in introducing product innovation, it has the 
limitation of being a self-reported measure and should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.   
Below  we  do  some  checks  on  the  validity  of  this  measure  by  showing  that  it  is  highly 
correlated with R&D employees (net of firm size) and number of R&D rivals (negatively), 
suggesting  that  this  self-reported  measure  is  reflecting  the  underlying  concept  of  relative 
R&D unit innovativeness. 
 
                                            
5  We also excluded 41 cases where the number of R&D employees was reported to be greater or 
equal to the number of total employees in their business unit, and 2 cases where the number of 
business unit R&D employees is zero, which we suspect are errors.    The results are qualitatively 
similar even if we include these cases.  
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Patents.    As an additional measure of innovativeness, we used the number of granted patents 
from the NBER patent database, which were matched to each CMS R&D unit based on 
paired lab names and addresses (see Roach and Cohen, 2010).
6    The data are composed of a 
count of the number of granted patents per responding R&D lab in each year from 1991 to 
1994.    We used the total count of patents of each respondent over the period of 1991 to 1994.   
Rather  than  using  firm-level  patent  counts,  we  are  using  business-unit  patents,  to  more 
closely  reflect  the  impact  of  business  unit  structures  and  environments  on  business  unit 
innovation.    Furthermore,  by  using  both  subjective  and  objective  measures  of 




3.2. Explanatory variables 
 
Integration.    The CMS asks the R&D managers to report which methods they have used to 
facilitate interaction among different functions.    There are four methods listed: a) rotation of 
personal  across  functions,  b)  project  teams  with  cross-functional  participation,  c) 
interdepartmental committees, and d) computer networks with electronic mail, bulletin board 
or conferencing capabilities (as the data were collected in 1994, use of this technology was 
not yet broadly institutionalized).    We summed the number of methods used by respondents 
to measure the level of integration.    The maximum is four and the minimum is zero.    This 
measure assumes that the use of more coordination mechanisms means a higher level of 
integration,  (cf.  Lawrence  and  Lorsch,  1967a).    However,  we  also  tested  those  four 
coordination mechanisms separately  and together to allow for variation in the integrative 
                                            
6  We thank Michael Roach for providing these data.  
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power of each mode and for comparison with our aggregate measure.   
 
Appropriability regime.    Different industries are characterized by greater or lesser emphasis 
on particular mechanisms for protecting the returns to their innovations (Cohen et al., 2000). 
The CMS asks respondents for what percent of their product innovations each appropriability 
mechanism  ---  secrecy,  patent  protection,  lead  time,  complementary  manufacturing 
capabilities  and  complementary  sales/service  ---  was  effective  in  protecting  their  firm’s 
competitive  advantage  from  those  innovations  in  the  period  1991-1993.    There  are  five 
response categories: 1) below 10%, 2) 10-40%, 3) 41-60%, 4) 61-90% and 5) over 90%.    In 
our  analysis,  we  created  an  industry-level  measure  to  represent  the  responding  firm’s 
appropriability environment for that business unit.    To obtain the variable, we calculated the 
means  by  industrial  category  (classifying  industries  by  International  Standard  Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) , rev. 3 codes) using the mid points of each response category as the 
value  for  responses  in  that  industry.    For  this  analysis,  we  used  secrecy,  and  created  a 
dummy variable called High_secrecy which is 1 if the industry mean for the use of secrecy 
for  that  firm’s  industry  is  greater  than  50%  and  0  otherwise.
7  Therefore,  High_secrecy 
reflects a group of high secrecy industry sectors. 
 
                                            
7  Here we report industry means and estimate industry fixed effects at a two or three digit ISIC level 
(33 industries). For estimating industry means for industry-level secrecy, we used a more detailed 
(generally 3-digit and sometimes 4-digit ISIC), yielding 65 industry sectors, in order to get a more 
fine-grained estimate of the business unit’s environment and to reduce collinearity problems.    The 
detailed process to create High_secrecy is as follows.    First, we calculated the means of secrecy 
percentages by industry (= industrial means) using the mid points of each response category: 5%, 25%, 
50%, 75%, 95%.    In this process, missing data are not valid.    Therefore, respondents who have 
missing  data  are  not  considered  for  calculating  their  industry  mean.    Second,  we  reassigned  the 
industry mean to all respondents in the industry category.    Hence respondents in the same industry 
category all have the same value of secrecy reflecting the prior work by Cohen et al. (2000), since we 
are  interested  in  the  environment  in  which  the  firm  operates.    In  this  process,  respondents  with 
missing  data  are  also  given  the  value  equal  to  their  industry’s  mean.    Third,  we  categorize 
respondents’ industries with their means greater than 50% (the overall mean) into the high secrecy 
industries and the industries with their means less than or equal to 50% into the low secrecy category.   
If an industry mean is greater than 50, High_secrecy is 1 and otherwise 0.  
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3.3. Control Variables 
 
R&D employees.    The CMS asked about the number of professional and technical R&D 
employees in their business unit.    For analysis, we used the natural log of the number of 
R&D  employees.    R&D  employees  are  highly  correlated  with  R&D  spending  but  have 
lower item non-response.    We also control for overall firm size (see below). 
   
No.  of  rivals.    Our  dependent  variables  measure  relative  performance.    A  respondent’s 
relative  performance  may  be  lower  if  it  has  many  innovating  rivals.    Therefore,  we 
controlled the number of “technology” rivals.    The CMS asks respondents how many firms 
are able to introduce competing innovations in time to effectively diminish their firm’s profits 
from their innovations, that is, the number of competing innovators.    There are six response 
categories: 1) 0, 2) 1-2, 3) 3-5, 4) 6-10, 5) 11-20, and 6) >20.    We used the mid points of 
each category (i.e., 0, 1.5, 4, 8, 15.5, and 25).  
 
Goal similarity.    To control for competition, we also consider the percentage of projects 
started by the R&D unit in the period of 1991 to 1993 that have the same technical goals as 
an R&D project conducted by at least one of their competitors.    There are five response 
categories: 1) 0%, 2) 1 - 25%, 3) 26 - 50%, 4) 51 - 75% and 5) 76 - 100%.    We used the mid 
points of each response category.   
 
Firm Size.    The size of an organization and structural differentiation are correlated (Blau, 
1970).    Therefore, we controlled for the size of firms measured by the natural log of the 
number of total employees in each firm, to control for underlying differences in the expected 
level of specialization and differentiation.      
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Industry diversity.    We controlled whether the firm operate in a single industry or more than 
one industry as an additional proxy of structural differentiation.    This is a dummy variable 
with 1 if the firm operates in more than one industry and 0 otherwise.   
 
Business unit age.    We also controlled for the age of business units measured by the natural 
log  of  the  difference  between  1994  and  the  beginning  of  that  business  unit,  since  older 
business units may be less innovative overall.   
 
Industry dummies.    We used industry sector fixed effects built on the International Standard 
Industrial  Classification  (ISIC)  codes  (Rev.  3).
8    The  reference  group  is  miscellaneous 
manufacturing. 
 
Reasons of patenting & Patent propensity.    Firms do not apply patents only for protecting 
their commercialized innovations (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, Cohen, et al. 2000), for example, 
to  block  others  from  patenting,  to  prevent  infringement  suits,  to  measure  engineers’ 
performance, for use in cross-licensing, etc.    Because there are many diverse reasons for 
patenting, in order to have patent counts more accurately reflect underlying innovation, we 
should control for a firm’s patenting strategy.    We have dummy variables for each of the 
following reasons to patent for product and process innovation respectively: i) to measure the 
performance of R&D personnel; ii) to obtain revenue through licensing the invention; iii) to 
improve their position in negotiations with other firms; iv) to prevent patent infringement 
suits against their firm; v) to prevent other firms from copying their invention; vi) to prevent 
other firms from patenting a related invention; and vii) to enhance the reputation of the firm 
or  its  R&D  employees.    Moreover,  not  all  innovations  are  patented  and  firms  (and 
                                            
8  Although we used 65 industry sectors when creating the High_secrey variable, we used aggregated 
industry sectors of industry dummies to avoid multicollinearity.    
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industries) vary in their propensity to patent. Therefore, we also control for the percentage of 
respondents’  R&D  unit’s  product  and  process  innovations  for  which  the  firm  applied  for 
patents, based on questions from the CMS.    These controls for patenting strategy help us 
separate patents as a measure of innovation from patents as a  reflection of firm strategy 
(Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Cohen, et al., 2002; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics              
   Variables  N  Mean  Min  Med  Max  STD 
1  Self-reported Innov.  1109  3.65  1  4  5  1.18 
2  No.of patents  1048  22.62  0  1  2857  127.50 
3  Integration  1115  2.63  0  3  4  1.08 
4  Rotation  1116  0.46  0  0  1  0.50 
5  Cross-func. team  1116  0.86  0  1  1  0.34 
6  Interdep. committee  1115  0.80  0  1  1  0.40 
7  Computer network  1116  0.50  0  0.50  1  0.50 
8  High secrecy  1122  0.51  0        1  1  0.50 
9  BU R&D employees  1057  247.13  1  20  5000+  1057.70 
10  Industry diversity  1081  0.57  0        1  1  0.50 
11  Firm size  1104  21359.15  2  3000  100000+  61368.51 
12  BU age  1008  49.25  1  42  262  35.47 
13  No.of rivals  1020  3.80  0  4  25  4.24 
14  Goal similarity  981  53.49  0  63  88  25.19 
 
Table 2. Self-reported innovativeness       




Substantially above average    328  29.58  328  29.58 
Slightly above average    311  28.04  639  57.62 
Average  286  25.79  925  83.41 
Slightly below average  118  10.64  1043  94.05 
Substantially below average  66  5.95  1109  100.00 
Frequency missing = 13             
 
 
Tables 1 and 2 give the summary statistics for our measures.    The tables show that the mean 
and  median  of  self-reported  innovativeness  is  “slightly  above  average”.    This  is  to  be 
expected, since the sample is firms that do R&D, which represents a more innovative subset 
of all firms in an industry.    There is also likely to be some response bias in this variable.    
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We will also use the number of patents in the period of 1991 to 1994 as the other measure of 
innovative performance, although this measure has its own limitations.    These two measures 
of  innovativeness  are  correlated  with  a  correlation  coefficient  of  0.14  (partial  correlation 
between self-reported innovativeness and natural log of (no. of patents +1), controlling for 
industry). Respondents received 23 patents on average over the four years.    The average 
business unit has 247 R&D employees.
9    R&D employees are correlated with self-reported 
innovativeness and with patent counts (Table 3).    Our descriptive statistics in Table 1 also 
report the characteristics of the explanatory variables. We can see that firms use more than 
two integrative mechanisms on average (=2.6).    The mean size of firms is 21,359 employees.   
The mean age of business units is 49 years old.    Firms and business units in our sample are, 
on average, large, established organizations, which suggests that integrating across function 
may  be  problematic.    Respondents  have  3  competitors  and  53%  of  goal  similarity  on 
average.    Table 3 reports the correlations among our variables.    Table 4
10  provides means 
of R&D intensity
11, patent productivity
12, and percentage of product innovations effectively 
protected by secrecy in each industry sector.    In our sample, precision instruments show the 
highest mean R&D intensity (= 12.20), followed by miscellaneous chemicals, computers, and 
communications equipment.    The lowest mean R&D intensity is printing/publishing (= 0.70), 
with metal, textiles, and steel also having relatively low R&D intensity.    The rankings by 
patent propensity are somewhat different.    In part, this is because the number of patents 
                                            
9  The descriptive statistics of business unit R&D employees, firm size, and business unit age in 
Table1 are from raw data before transformation into natural logs. 
10  For this table, we recoded high extremes equal to the value of the 95
th percentile and low extremes 
equal to the value of the 5
th percentile for the number of business unit R&D employees, the number of 
business unit total employees, the number of granted patents during 1991 to 1994, and firm total sales, 
and then computed R&D intensity and patent productivity. 
11  R&D intensity in Table 4 indicates the industrial means of ratios of the number of business unit 
R&D employees to the number of business unit total employees weighted by the number of business 
unit total employees.    All values were multiplied by 100 for easier comparison. 
12  Patent productivity in Table 4 is defined as the industrial means of the number of patents to the 
total sales (unit of $100 mil.) of each firm weighed by firm total sales (unit of $100 mil.).    All values 
were multiplied by 100 for easier comparison.  
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reflects firm size and the effectiveness of patents, which vary by industry, in addition to 
underlying innovation.    Precision instruments have the highest mean of patent productivity 
(= 1.55), followed by medical equipment, computers, and drugs.    Printing/publishing again 
has  the  lowest  mean  of  patent  productivity  (=  0.02).    Both  of  these  measures  can  be 
interpreted as measuring “high-tech” versus “low-tech”, although patents are driven by other 
factors in addition to underlying rates of innovation, including firm size and the effectiveness 
of patents (Griliches, 1990; Cohen et al., 2000).    For secrecy, miscellaneous chemicals has 
the highest use of secrecy for protecting their product innovation (= 69.82%) followed by 
metals,  textiles,  and  petroleum  while  printing/publishing  is  least  reliant  on  secrecy  (= 
32.50%).    As  the  muffin  example  suggests,  food  products  also  have  high  secrecy.    The 
average values of industrial means for R&D intensity, patent productivity and secrecy are 












3.4. Analysis Method 
 
As proxies for innovative performance, we used self-reported innovativeness and the 
number of granted patents.    These two measures reflect both the dominant perspective on  
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innovation  research  before  the  1980s  and  the  Schumpeterian  perspective  after  the  1980s 
(Arundel et al., 2007).    The dominant perspective has viewed that innovation was measured 
by the amount of patents or patent applications led by R&D inputs (Arundel et al., 2007; 
Giuri et al., 2007).    However, patents have problems as a measure of innovation output.   
Griliches  (1990)  points  out  that  patent  applications  rely  on  economic  conditions;  that 
inventions have different patentability and propensity to be patented; and that patents have 
intrinsic quality variability.    Thus, the propensity of patent applications to be granted and the 
quality of patents have a skewed distribution (Pakes, 1986; Schankerman and Pakes, 1986).   
Patents  or  patent  applications  do  not  reflect  products  of  inventive  or  innovative  activity, 
which is created by a small number of valuable patents, and instead may be better interpreted 
as a measure of the input index of inventive activity (Schmookler, 1951; Griliches, 1990).   
The re-discovered Schumpeterian perspective has tried to overcome these limitations of the 
dominant perspective by distinguishing invention from innovation and developing innovation 
indicators (Arundel, 2007; Arundel et al., 2007; Giuri et al., 2007).    Our main dependent 
variable, self-reported innovativeness, reflects this Schumpeterian perspective although we 
admit  there  are  also  limitations  from  using  a  self-reported  measure.    Using  both  self-
reported innovativeness and the count of patents, we can see how consistent our results are 
across different indicators.     
For the self-report measure, we use the ordered logistic regression models.    On the 
other hand, we modeled a negative binomial regression for patents, as the distribution of 
patents is overdispersed with its variance significantly larger than its mean (Hausman et al., 
1984).    Moreover, to test the secrecy environment contingency theory (Hypothesis 2), we 
adopted the interaction approach.    Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) fleshed out the structural 
contingency theory underlying the fit of context and structure.    They introduced three test 
methods: the selection, interaction, and systems approaches.    While the selection approach  
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tests congruence between context and structure, the interaction and systems approaches test 
the fit of context-structure and performance (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985).    Moreover, the 
interaction approach analyzes specific pairs of context-structure variables while the systems 
approach assesses the holistic patterns of context, structure and performance (Miller, 1981; 
Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985).    For testing our first-level contingency (that integration is 
associated  with  performance  in  the  high  uncertainty  context  of  R&D),  we  are  implicitly 
adopting a selection approach.    However, for testing the explicit (second-level) contingency 
between the level of secrecy in the environment and the relation between integration and 






We  use  these  measures  to  test  our  hypotheses,  comparing  results  across  our  two 
measures of innovation: self-reported innovativeness and patents.    We begin by examining 
the effects of integration on R&D performance, controlling for other predictors of innovation.   
We also test the effect of integration on performance contingent on the level of differentiation, 
which is a finding of early contingency theory.    Finally, we test for the interaction between 
secrecy and integration to see if R&D units in high-secrecy environments benefit less from 
integration, which is a new finding based on contingency theory. 
 
---------INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE---------------- 
 
---------INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE----------------  
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4.1 The effect of integration on organizational performance   
 
We  begin  with  our  first  hypothesis,  which  is  the  relation  between  integration  and 
innovation.    For the analysis of the effect of integration, we first test our model using all 
1122 cases.    Our measure of integration is the sum of the four separate integration modes.   
However,  we  also  test  the  individual  items  separately.    Furthermore,  since  the  effect  of 
integration should be most apparent when differentiation is high, we test the models using 
only large, Fortune 500-sized firms, yielding a restricted sample of 522 cases.
13    Although 
we used industry diversity and firm size to control the level of differentiation, looking at the 
effect  of  integration  limiting  to  very  large  firms  can  be  another  way  of  checking  the 
robustness  of  our  findings,  because  very  large  firms  should  have  more  subdivisions  and 
problems of coordinating those differentiated subunits (Blau, 1970).    Although we consider 
production, marketing, and R&D divisions based on the survey construction, the increasing 
size of an organization should generate more differentiation even within each division of 
production, market, and R&D, thereby increasing the need for the integration of R&D units 
with other units for successful innovative activity.    However, large organizations have also 
likely already developed organizational routines that can restrain R&D units’ creativity and 
radical  research  due  to  integrative  routines  or  procedures  (Rogers,  1995).    The 
organizational  inertia  of  large  established  firms  can  be  resistant  to  change  and  hinder 
innovations (Henderson and Clark, 1990).    Moreover, internal competition may make R&D 
units more conservative and limit the effectiveness of integrative mechanisms (Fosfuri and 
Rønde,  2009).    Therefore,  integration  might  have  a  negative  effect  on  innovative 
performance in large enterprises, implying independent, less integrated R&D units (such as 
                                            
13  Fortune 500
th firm in 1994 is Texas Industries whose sales were $614.3 million.    To limit sample 
to large firms equivalent to Fortune 500 firms in 1994, we selected firms whose sales were greater 
than and equal to $614.3 million.   
(From http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/snapshots/1994)  
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skunkworks) should make greater contribution to innovative performance (H1b).    Thus, we 
will see if the effects of integration are greater or lesser in the large firm sub-sample, to 
explore the relative impact of differentiation versus bureaucratization. Furthermore, we will 
see if the interaction effect of integration and industry diversity is positive, again suggesting 
that integration is especially important in the face of organizational diversity.   
Looking at our result, first, the ordered logistic regression and the negative binomial 
regression for the full sample show that the aggregate measure of integration has a significant 
positive effect on innovativeness and patents, controlling for industry diversity, R&D, firm 
size, age, number of rivals and industry, as shown in Model 2 of Tables 5 and 6.
14    Thus, we 
find support for Hypothesis 1a implying that, on average, integrated R&D units are more 
effective  for  innovation  than  isolated  R&D  units.    We  next  examine  each  mechanism 
separately.    Different coordination mechanisms have different purposes and characteristics.   
March and Simon (1958) categorize types of coordination into coordination by programming 
and coordination by feedback.    Coordination by programming corresponds to impersonal 
coordination mechanisms such as schedules, official rules and procedures while coordination 
by feedback includes personal mechanisms such as mutual communication and adjustments 
through  vertical  and  horizontal  channels,  and  group  mechanisms  such  as  scheduled  and 
unscheduled meetings (March and Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976; 
Nihtila, 1999).    The form of coordination depends on the nature of the knowledge being 
shared.    Our integration measures are designed to capture this higher-level coordination by 
feedback, but each mechanism might have greater or lesser effects.    Therefore, we check the 
effect of each mechanism separately, one by one, and then all together.    Models 3, 4, 5 and 6 
                                            
14 Because of limited cases in a few industries, we collapsed some small industries into miscellaneous, 
leaving 31 industry dummies for these equations.    For the limited sample of very large firms, we had 
30 dummies for the self-reported innovativeness equation and 29 dummies for the patents equation. 
The patent equations also includes controls for reasons to patent product and process innovations and 
patent propensity.  
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in  Tables  5  and  6  show  the  effect  of  the  distinct  coordination  modes  on  innovative 
performance.    In general, each individual item has only a modest effect.    Only rotation has 
a significant positive effect on innovativeness, and only computer network positively affects 
patents.    When we put the four separate modes all together as shown in Model 7 of both 
tables, we do not find any critical evidence that those different coordination modes were 
offset by each other (though some effects are negative in Model 7, they are not significantly 
so, nor are the standard errors substantially inflated) or that their variation was a serious 
problem in using the aggregation of the individual mechanisms as a proxy of integration.   
Therefore,  we  will  use  our  more  robust  measure  of  the  sum  of  integration  mechanisms, 
following prior literature that suggest that using more coordination modes could create  a 
higher level of integration with more integrative opportunities and the synergy effect across 
coordinative mechanisms.   




Integration  is  important  when  the  organization  is  functionally  or  structurally 
differentiated.    Therefore, the effect of integration should vary by the level of differentiation.   
We tested the effect of integration contingent on the level of differentiation in two different 
ways: an interaction approach and a selection approach.    First, Model 8 in Tables 5 and 6 
presents  the  effect  of  the  interaction  of  integration  and  intra-organization  diversity  on 
innovative  performance.  The  significant  effect  of  the  interaction  between  integration  and 
industry  diversity  shows  that  the  increasing  level  of  integration  enhances  the  expected 
innovativeness in high diversity firms more than in the low diversity firms.    Because of the 
non-linearities in the ordered logit model (which prevent a simple interpretation of the sign 
and significance of the interaction term, see Wiersama and Bowen, 2009), we use a graphical 
representation to show the overall effect of the interaction term, across different values of 
integration. Figure 1 illustrates the change of expected innovativeness by integration for high 
and low diversity, which is calculated using predicted probabilities based on Model 8 in Table 
5.
15  In  Table  6,  the  effect  of  the  interaction  on  the  number  of  patents  is  also  positive, 
although not significant.    Second, taking a selection approach, we limit our analysis to the 
large firms subsample. Model 9 of Table 5 shows that for this sample as well, integration has 
a significantly positive effect on innovative performance, consistent with the assumption that 
large firms have more subdivisions and are likely to face problems of coordination, showing 
further  support  for  Hypothesis  1a  (rather  than  the  bureaucratic  rigidity  argument  in 
Hypothesis 1b).    The effect of integration on the number of patents in very large firms is 
also  positive,  but  not  quite  statistically  significant  (p=.11).    For  both  self-reported 
innovativeness and patents, the impact of integration is even larger for the very large firms 
(compare Models 2 and 9 in Tables 5 and 6), although the difference from the overall sample 
estimate is not statistically significant.    Overall, the evidence suggests that information and 
                                            
15 This  graph  shows  a  case  of  miscellaneous  manufacturing  (=  the  reference  group  of  industry 
dummies) holding all other variables at their means.  
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coordination benefits from integration improve firm innovative performance.   
For controls, as expected, greater R&D effort (controlling for firm size) contributes to 
higher  self-reported  innovativeness  (giving  us  more  confidence  that  we  are  measuring 
innovativeness) and more patents.    The effect of firm size shows the opposite directions in 
the  models  of  self-reported  innovativeness  and  patents.    Firm  size  has  a  negative  and 
significant effect on innovativeness (except Model 9 in Table 5
16) while it has a positive and 
significant  effect  on  patents.    This  may  reflect  ongoing  arguments  about  the  relations 
between firm size and innovative advantage (with large firms being less innovative), and the 
relations between firm size and patent propensity (see Cohen et al., 2000).    In the latter, the 
positive effect of firm size on patents suggests one of the limitations of patents as a measure 
of innovation, implying that large firms have higher rates of patenting, perhaps due to a need 
to  protect  capital  assets  (Hall  and  Ziedonis,  2001)  and  perhaps  due  to  greater  access  to 
resources for patent prosecution, for example, having an in-house patent office (Cohen, et al., 
2000).    The  number  of  competing  innovators  affects  innovativeness  strongly  negatively, 
suggesting that on average a respondent’s relative performance will be lower if it has many 
technology rivals.    Goal similarity has a positive significant effect on innovativeness while it 
has little effect on patent counts.    Having a similar goal with competitors could motivate the 
business unit to move faster to win the competition. 
 
 
4.2 Integration in high and low secrecy industries 
 
Finally,  we  hypothesize  that  the  effect  of  integration  is  dampened  for  industries 
where  secrecy  is  a  key  appropriability  mechanism,  because  while  integration  generates 
                                            




connections among people across different work units, it is also likely to increase outflows, 
resulting in spillovers to competitors (Jaffe et al., 2000).    One concern is that firms would 
not engage in integration if they are in high-secrecy industries, because of fears of spillover. 
We ran a t-test of integration for high and low secrecy in Table 7 and could not reject the null 
that the means of integration in high and low secrecy are equal.    The means of integration in 
high and low secrecy environments are very similar (2.65 v. 2.60), suggesting that firms are 
not organized significantly differently in the two environments, although the effects may be 
distinct.    Thus,  firms  in  both  sectors  seem  to  engage  in  integration.    But,  because  of 
problems with spillover or unwillingness to share, integration may be less effective in the 
high secrecy sector.     
 
Table 7. T-test of integration for secrecy categories 
   Secrecy     Test statistic 
Variable  High  Low     t-value 



















Model 10 in Table 5 shows support for the hypothesis, with the positive effect of 
integration being weaker in high secrecy industries.    Figure 2, which estimates the effect on 
innovativeness of different levels of integration for high and low secrecy industries, shows 
that  an  increasing  level  of  integration  enhances  the  expected  innovativeness  in  the  low 
secrecy environment substantially more than is the case in the high secrecy environment.
17  In 
other words, the relation between integration and performance is likely to be contingent on 
the  importance  of  secrecy.    When  newly  developed  know-how  needs  to  be  kept  secret, 
groups  would  be  more  reluctant  to  share  their  knowledge  even  though  they  are  joining 
integrative  activity  because  the  sharing  can  escalate  the  risk  of  disclosure  of  the  secret, 
thereby risking outflow of their secret to external agents such as imitators and competitors.   
                                            
17  This  graph  shows  a  case  of  miscellaneous  manufacturing  (=  the  reference  group  of  industry 
dummies) holding all other variables at their means.  
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In this case, even though an organization is using diverse integrative methods, it can be less 
effective  for  performance  because  of  limited  participation  by  cautious  participants.   
Alternatively, fully-shared information within an organization could leak to external agents 
such  as  suppliers,  venture  capitalists,  and  competitors  in  the  process  of  exchanging 
information for commercialization or partnership, which can result in loss of lead time or 
being overtaken by competitors building on this knowledge.    In Model 10 of Table 6, the 
contingent  effect  is  not  significant  for  patent  counts,  although  still  negative.    For  an 
additional robustness check, we test the same model limiting to the count of patents in 1994 
(i.e., after the R&D organization data are measures), to address issues of reverse causality.   
Model  11  in  Table  6  presents  the  results,  showing  that  the  effect  of  integration  is  even 
stronger,  and  the  negative  interaction  effect  with  secrecy  is  also  larger,  though  still  not 
statistically significant. Overall, our results suggest that, while integration generally improves 





The results show that intra-organizational integration is important for firm innovation, 
in  particular,  in  both  an  uncertain  and  complex  environment  and  a  highly  differentiated 
organizational structure.    We also saw that increasing connections among people across their 
work units may have a down side in the face of R&D competition, because of problems of 
spillovers  (Jaffe  et  al.,  2000).    We  found  that  integration  may  be  less  effective  on 
innovativeness if secrecy is a key to competitive advantage.    Thus, we see evidence that the 
use of integrative mechanisms may be less effective in some environments (high-secrecy) 
than others, expanding the findings of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, 1967b) and subsequent  
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contingency theorists who have argued that integration was especially  important for high 
uncertainty functions like R&D.    We find that the earlier contingency theorists’ argument is 
true, but that there is a second-level contingency, such that the benefit, even for R&D, is 
dampened in the face of concerns about secrecy.    While integration is shown to be important 
for  R&D  performance,  the  effectiveness  of  these  integration  mechanisms  can  vary  by 
appropriability environments (i.e., high secrecy and low secrecy).    Thus, our results build on 
earlier  contingency  theory  models  to  develop  a  theory  of  appropriability  regime 
contingencies  as  a  moderator  of  the  relation  between  integration  and  performance.   
Unfortunately,  our  measures  using  survey  data  have  some  important  limitation.    It  is 
possible  the  range  on  our  variable  (0  to  4)  was  too  narrow  to  clearly  see  some  effects.   
Perhaps  a  more  nuanced  measure  might  have  captured  significant  interaction  effects  for 
patent  counts.    However,  our  results  are  generally  robust  across  different  measures  of 
innovation (at least in direction, if not always in statistical significance).    Additional work 
that compares across other measures of innovation are needed to see how robust our findings 
are to different ways of capturing the concept of innovation. 
Integration in our study means knowledge management and coordination through 
various  organizational  mechanisms.    Formal  coordinative  methods  provide  cooperation 
opportunities across the organization based on  tasks for members in different work units 
bridging their diverse social and technological attributes.    However, informal interaction can 
also provide avenues for building integration within the organization.    In particular, bridging 
different work units through  formal devices would be more necessary  in an organization 
where individuals with similar expertise are spatial proximate to each other and distant from 
those  with  complementary  expertise.    Thus,  alternative  to  building  integrating  structures 
such  as  cross-functional  teams,  organizational  geographical  proximity  (Liu,  2009)  can  be 
manipulated to encourage integration to improve information access and firm performance.    
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The effects of integration, however, will also be differently contingent on the environment in 
which the organization is involved (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a).   
Future  work  needs  to  look  at  other  factors  to  further  develop  our  understanding  of  the 
environmental  factors  that  condition  the  relations  between  intra-organizational  integration 
and innovativeness.     
Lastly,  we  have  an  open  question  about  whether  integration  plays  a  role  as  a 
facilitator or an obstacle to the performance of non-R&D units.    We only focused on R&D 
units in this analysis of integration and saw the positive effect of integration on performance 
of R&D units, which is also a proxy for the innovative performance of firms.    These results 
may not  generalize to other parts of the organization.    For example, tight links between 
R&D and manufacturing may interfere with smooth functioning of the production process as 
R&D continually tries to tinker with production (Burns and Stalker, 1961).    Similarly, tight 
links between sales and R&D may make sales more difficult as R&D employees share ideas 
for next generation projects with customers that might undermine their willingness to buy the 
current offerings.    Therefore, the analysis of the effects of integration on non-R&D units and 
overall firm performance will have to be examined by future work. 
We  see  that  organizational  structures  can  have  important  effects  on  innovative 
activities.    Moreover, these relations are contingent on the appropriability environment in an 
industry, suggesting that firms need to match their structures to the appropriability strategies 
that  are  most  effective  in  an  industry.    In  particular,  our  results  suggest  there  may  be 
tradeoffs between encouraging inter-unit integration and protecting proprietary information. 
R&D managers should keep these tradeoffs in mind when designing structures to encourage 
intra-organizational information sharing.    At the same time, the results suggest that, even 
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